Garbed as tourism, China’s overtures a modern echo of ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’
It’s a diplomatic gesture laden with symbolism, timing, and strategic intent. China’s recent overtures towards India — easing visa procedures, slashing fees for Indian tourists, and extending cultural invitations — are being pitched as routine post-pandemic economic moves aimed at reviving tourism and people-to-people contact. But scratch the surface, and it’s clear these initiatives carry echoes of a bygone era when India and China sought to frame themselves as fraternal Asian powers under the slogan ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’.
Back in the early 1950s, both nations, freshly liberated from colonial domination and internal turmoil, reached out to one another in a grand display of Asian solidarity. Cultural delegations criss crossed borders, trade agreements were signed with much fanfare, and warm personal equations were struck between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai. Together, they projected a vision of Asian resurgence at a time when the Cold War had divided the world into rival ideological camps.
For a brief period, Delhi and Beijing promoted the idea that ancient Asian civilisations could chart their own independent path, free from Western dominance. Today’s overtures, though couched in the language of tourism and culture, appear to dip into the same historical playbook — albeit in a far more complex, competitive, and contested geopolitical landscape.
However, just as in the 1950s, this soft diplomacy today coexists with deep-seated strategic mistrust. Then, as now, the border issues remained unresolved, with simmering tensions that eventually exploded into the brief but bitter 1962 war. Today, despite this sudden warmth in tourism and cultural diplomacy, the Line of Actual Control remains heavily militarised. Several rounds of high-level military talks have yielded only incremental disengagement, while confidence-building measures struggle to keep step with frequent border transgressions and competing territorial claims.
The key difference is that India is far less naïve today than it was in the idealistic post-Independence years. The sobering lessons of 1962 — and more recently, the bloody Galwan Valley clash of 2020 — have made New Delhi acutely aware of the risks of getting swayed by symbolic soft power overtures without addressing the core disputes that define the relationship. Strategic caution has long replaced the rhetoric of Asian brotherhood, and Indian policymakers now view diplomatic gestures from Beijing through a far more pragmatic, security-first lens.
Yet, from China’s perspective, this strategy follows the same old playbook: use cultural diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, and economic incentives to soften the public narrative while keeping hard power intact along the borders. It’s an attempt to shape the atmosphere of bilateral relations, moderate international perceptions, and generate economic stakes in favour of stability — all without making real concessions where it matters most.
In that sense, one could argue that this is a modern, transactional version of ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ — minus the innocence, optimism, and idealism of the 1950s, and with both nations far more hardened by history and realpolitik. The slogans may have faded, but the tactical use of soft power diplomacy as a cover for unresolved disputes and strategic contestation remains a defining feature of this complex and often uneasy relationship.
Whether this gambit can meaningfully alter India’s strategic calculus, however, remains an open question.
